In Bankruptcy Hardball, Professor Jared Ellias teams up with attorney Robert Stark to expose increasingly aggressive tactics by corporate managers in bankruptcy proceedings. The article, which draws on detailed case studies, is a methodological departure from Professor Ellias’s usual empirical quantitative work. But the insights are incisive as usual. The article details maneuvers by corporate… Continue reading →

In 2005, popular disgust with several high-profile cases of bankrupt firms paying top executives large “retention” bonuses led Congress to prohibit such bonuses for firms in Chapter 11. In a forthcoming article in the Southern California Law Review, Regulating Bankruptcy Bonuses, Professor Jared Ellias suggests that firms have found ways to evade this prohibition, so… Continue reading →

What drives forum-shopping? Is it that sophisticated litigants seek jurisdictions that offer judicial expertise and predictable application of the law, or is it that sophisticated litigants seek to game the system by seeking out judges more likely to be biased in their favor? In “What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data,” Professor Jared… Continue reading →